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INFINITE PREVISIONS AND FINITELY ADDITIVE
EXPECTATIONS
By M.J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld and J.B. Kadane
Carnegie Mellon University
We give an extension of de Finetti’s concept of coherence to unbounded
(but real-valued) random variables that allows for gambling in the pres-
ence of infinite previsions. We present a finitely additive extension of the
Daniell integral to unbounded random variables that we believe has ad-
vantages over Lebesgue-style integrals in the finitely additive setting. We
also give a general version of the Fundamental Theorem of Prevision to
deal with conditional previsions and unbounded random variables.
1. Introduction. De Finetti (1974) presented a theory of finitely additive
probability in which the concept of prevision played the roles of both probability
and expected value (or expectation). De Finetti’s theory was motivated in two
different, but equivalent, manners. First, he developed a theory of coherent
gambling in which a bookie chooses fair prices for gambles while trying to avoid
uniform sure loss. Second, he took a decision-theoretic approach in which an
agent chooses previsions for random variables while being subject to a loss
function. The agent tries to avoid choosing previsions such that an alternative
choice could achieve uniformly smaller loss.
De Finetti developed his theory fairly completely for the case in which all
random variables under consideration are bounded. He realized that unbounded
random variables introduce interesting issues for his theory, but he did not pur-
sue those issues very far. Crisma, Gigante, and Millossovich (1997) and Crisma
and Gigante (2001) present one form of an extension of de Finetti’s theory to
unbounded random variables. This paper presents a number of extensions that
are more in the spirit of de Finetti’s original theory.
Section 2 gives a brief summary of de Finetti’s theory for random variables
with finite previsions and the notation that will be used in the rest of the
paper. Section 3 gives our extension of coherence to infinite previsions and
compares the extension to the existing extension of Crisma et al. (1997) and
Crisma and Gigante (2001). Section 4 shows how the fair price and decision
theoretic motivations of de Finetti’s theory remain equivalent in the extension
to unbounded random variables and to more general loss functions than de
Finetti originally envisioned. Section 5 gives an introduction to finitely additive
Daniell integrals along with their relation to finitely additive expectations and
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coherence. Section 6 characterizes the relationship between conditional and
marginal previsions. Section 7 shows how to extend a collection of coherent
previsions to an arbitrary larger collection.
2. De Finetti’s Two Definitions of Coherence. Coherence of pre-
visions, as de Finetti (1974, Chapter 3) formulates it, is the criterion that a
rational decision maker tries to avoid making decisions that lead to uniformly
larger loss than alternative available decisions.
Let Ω be a set. The elements of Ω will be called states and denoted ω.
Subsets of Ω are called events. Random variables are real-valued functions
with domain Ω, which we denote with capital letters. We take the liberty of
identifying events with their indicator random variables. That is, if B ⊆ Ω, we
let B(ω) stand for the random variable that equals 1 for all ω ∈ B and equals
0 for all ω 6∈ B. The decisions that de Finetti (1974) contemplated are the
assignments of (conditional) previsions for random variables.
Definition 1. Let X be a random variable and let B be a nonempty event.
A prevision P (X |B) for X given B is a fair price for buying and selling X under
the condition that B occurs. That is, for all real α, the gamble that causes the
agent to gain αB[X − P (X)] is considered fair (or acceptable). If B = Ω, we
can denote P (X |Ω) = P (X) and call it a marginal prevision for X .
A collection {P (Xi|Bi) : i ∈ I} of such previsions is coherent1 if, for every
finite subset {i1, . . . , in} ⊆ I and all real α1, . . . , αn
sup
ω
n∑
j=1
αjBij (ω)[Xij (ω)− P (Xij )] ≥ 0.(1)
That is, the resulting fair gambles do not allow uniformly negative gain (also
known as uniform sure loss).
A collection of forecasts is coherent2 if, for every rival set {Q(Xi|Bi) : i ∈ I}
of previsions for the same random variables, every {i1, . . . , in} ⊆ I, and all
nonnegative α1, . . . , αn,
inf
ω
n∑
j=1
αjBij (ω)
{
[Xij (ω)− P (Xij )]
2 − [Xij (ω)−Q(Xij )]
2
}
≤ 0.
That is, no rival set of previsions leads to uniformly smaller squared-error loss.
De Finetti (1974, pp. 88–89) proved that a decision maker who wishes to
be both coherent1 and coherent2 must choose the same previsions for both
purposes. Squared-error loss is a special case of a strictly proper scoring rule.
Definition 2. A scoring rule for coherent previsions of a random variable
X is a real-valued loss function g with two real arguments: a value of the
random variable and a potential prevision q. Let P be a collection of probability
distributions that give finite prevision to X . We say that g is proper for P if,
for every probability P ∈ P , P [g(X, q)] is minimized (as a function of q) by
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q = P (X). If, in addition, only the quantity q = P (X) minimizes expected
score, then the scoring rule is strictly proper.
Some authors reserve the qualification “strictly proper” for scoring rules
that are designed to elicit an entire distribution, rather than just the mean of a
distribution. (See Gneiting, 2011a, who calls the latter kind strictly consistent.)
For the remainder of this paper, we follow the language of Definition 2, which
matches the usage in Gneiting (2011b).
Schervish, et al. (2013) consider the class of all scoring rules of the form
g(x, q) =


∫ q
x
(v − x)dλ(v) if x ≤ q,
∫ x
q
(x− v)dλ(v) if x > q,
(2)
where λ is a measure that is mutually absolutely continuous with Lebesgue
measure and is finite on every bounded interval. They also show that all such
scoring rules are strictly proper for the class of probability measures that give
finite mean to g(X, q) for at least one q. The form (2) is suggested by equation
(4.3) of Savage (1971).
Theorem 1 in Section 4 generalizes the equivalence of coherence1 and coherence2
to the class of strictly proper scoring rules of the form (2).
3. Infinite Previsions. If one wishes to consider arbitrary sets of random
variables, including unbounded random variables, then there will be examples
of random variables that cannot be assigned finite previsions or expectations.
One cannot expect a bookie to offer to pay an infinite amount in exchange for
a finite-valued random variable, no matter how likely it is to take large values.
In particular, (1) makes no sense as a criterion for coherence if previsions are
allowed to be infinite. Instead, we interpret an infinite prevision as an offer
to accept one side or the other of a gamble, but not both sides. For example,
P (X) = ∞ means that the bookie would pay an arbitrarily large amount c
in exchange for receiving X , but she would not accept any finite amount in
exchange for paying out X . We express that idea formally in Definition 3.
Definition 3. Let X be a random variable, and let B be a nonempty event.
To say that P (X |B) = ∞ means that every finite number can be the price to
buy X , but no number can be the price to sell X , under the condition that B
occurs. Similarly, to say that P (X |B) = −∞ means that every finite number
can be the price to sell X , but no number can be the price to buy X , under
the condition that B occurs. The resulting gambles αB[X − c] that the agent is
willing to accept, namely those with α ≥ 0 when P (X |B) =∞ and those with
α ≤ 0 when P (X |B) = −∞ are called acceptable. We also call each finite sum
of acceptable gambles acceptable.
We can now extend coherence1 to collections that include infinite previsions.
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Definition 4. Let {P (Xi|Bi) : i ∈ I} be a collection of previsions. The
previsions are coherent1 if,
sup
ω
n∑
j=1
αjBij (ω)[Xij (ω)− cj] ≥ 0,(3)
for all {i1, . . . , in} ⊆ I, all real α1, . . . , αn such that αj ≥ 0 for all j with
P (Xij |Bij ) = ∞ and αj ≤ 0 for all j with P (Xij |Bij ) = −∞, and all real
c1 . . . , cn such that cj = P (Xij |Bij ) for each j such that P (Xij |Bij ) is finite.
That is, no acceptable gamble leads to uniform sure loss.
A necessary condition for P (X) = ∞ to be coherent1 is that X is unbounded
above, and a necessary condition for P (X) = −∞ to be coherent1 is that X is
unbounded below. But there are unbounded random variables with coherent1
finite previsions.
Example 1. Let Ω be the integers, and suppose that P ({ω = k}) = 2−k
for each integer k ≥ 1. This is a countably additive probability. Let X(ω) =∑∞
k=1 k{ω = k}. The countably additive expectation of X is 2, which is a
coherent1 finite prevision for X . Actually, every number greater than or equal
to 2 (including∞) is a coherent1 prevision for X . On the other hand, if Y (ω) =∑∞
k=1 2
k{ω = k}, then the only coherent1 prevision for Y is ∞. Also, let
Z(ω) =
∑∞
k=1−k{ω = −k}. The countably additive expectation of Z is 0,
but we will set P (Z) = −∞. Finally, let V = Y + Z. We cannot assign
P (V ) = ∞−∞, however every extended real number is a possible coherent1
prevision for V . The rest of this example shows that the stated previsions
are coherent1. The random variables to which we have assigned previsions
are the indicators of the events {ω = k} for all integers k and the random
variablesX,Y, Z, V . The most general acceptable gamble is a linear combination
of finitely many of the indicators and X − x (with x ≥ 2 and nonnegative
coefficient if P (X) = ∞) together with Y − y (with y real and nonnegative
coefficient), Z − z (with z real and nonpositive coefficient), and V − v (with
v real and coefficient whose sign matches the sign of the prevision if P (V ) is
infinite. That is, let k1, . . . , kn be integers, and let
W (ω) =
n∑
j=1
αj
[
{ω = kj} − 2
−kj
]
+αX [X−x]+αY [Y −y]+αZ[Z−z]+αV [V −v],
where x ≥ 2, y, z and v are finite, αY ≥ 0, αZ ≤ 0, αX ≥ 0 if P (X) =∞, and
the sign of αV matches the sign of P (V ) if P (V ) is infinite. Then all acceptable
gambles are of the form of W . If αY > 0 or if αZ < 0 or if αX > 0 or if αV 6= 0,
then W clearly takes some nonnegative values so that the supremum is at least
0. The only cases not handled yet have αX ≤ 0 and αY = αZ = αv = 0. In this
case,
W (ω) =
n∑
j=1
αj
[
{ω = kj} − 2
−kj
]
+ αX [X − 2]− αX(c− 2).
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Since −αX(c− 2) ≥ 0, W is no smaller than
W ′(ω) =
n∑
j=1
αj
[
{ω = kj} − 2
−kj
]
+ αX [X − 2].
Since
∑∞
ω=1W
′(ω)2−ω = 0, supωW
′(ω) ≥ 0, hence supωW (ω) ≥ 0, and the
previsions are coherent1.
An alternative definition of coherent infinite marginal previsions was pre-
sented by Crisma et al. (1997). We repeat their definition here, and then prove
that it is equivalent to Definition 4 for marginal previsions.
Definition 5. Let I be an index set, and let D = {Xi : i ∈ I} be a
collection of random variables defined on Ω. Let P be an extended-real-valued
function defined on D. We say that P is extended-coherent if
inf
ω∈Ω
n∑
j=1
αjXij (ω) ≤
n∑
j=1
αjP (Xij ) ≤ sup
ω∈Ω
n∑
j=1
αjXij (ω),(4)
for every finite integer n, all i1, . . . , in ∈ I, and all real α1, . . . , αn such that all
infinite terms of the form αjP (Xij ) have the same sign.
It is not clear how Definition 5 regulates the prices that a bookie is willing to
pay/accept for various gambles with infinite previsions. Furthermore, Defini-
tion 5 does not apply to conditional previsions as stated. On the other hand,
Definitions 5 and 4 are equivalent when applied to marginal previsions.
Lemma 1. A collection {P (Xi) : i ∈ I} of marginal previsions is extended-
coherent if and only if it is coherent1.
Proof. For the “if” direction, assume that the previsions are coherent1.
Let n be a finite integer, let i1, . . . , in ∈ I, and let α1, . . . , αn be real numbers
such that all infinite values of αjP (Xij ) have the same sign. We need to show
that (4) holds. First, suppose that all of the P (Xij ) are finite. By coherence1,
we know that
sup
ω∈Ω
n∑
j=1
αj [Xij (ω)− P (XiJ )] ≥ 0,(5)
sup
ω∈Ω
n∑
j=1
(−αj)[Xij (ω)− P (XiJ )] ≥ 0.(6)
Inequality (6) implies the first inequality in (4), and (5) implies the second.
Next, suppose that there are some infinite previsions among the P (Xij ) and
all of the corresponding αjP (Xij ) have the same sign. If the common sign is
negative, then
∑n
j=1 αjP (Xij ) = −∞, the second inequality in (4) is trivially
satisfied, and the αj corresponding to infinite previsions all have the wrong signs
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to be used in acceptable gambles. It follows that for all real c1, . . . , cn such that
cj = P (Xij ) whenever P (Xij ) is finite,
sup
ω∈Ω
n∑
j=1
(−αj)[Xij (ω)− cj ] ≥ 0,
which implies the first inequality in (4). If the common sign of the αjP (Xij )
is positive, then
∑n
j=1 αjP (Xij ) = ∞, the first inequality in (4) is trivially
satisfied, and the αj corresponding to infinite previsions all have the correct
signs to be used in acceptable gambles. It follows that for all real c1, . . . , cn
such that cj = P (Xij ) whenever P (Xij ) is finite,
sup
ω∈Ω
n∑
j=1
αj [Xij (ω)− cj ] ≥ 0,
which implies the second inequality in (4).
For the “only if” direction, assume that the previsions are extended-coherent.
Let n be a finite integer, let i1, . . . , in ∈ I, and let α1, . . . , αn be real numbers
such that all infinite values of αjP (Xij ) are positive. We need to show that
sup
ω∈Ω
n∑
j=1
αj [Xij (ω)− cj ] ≥ 0,(7)
for all real c1, . . . , cn such that cj = P (Xij ) for all i such that P (Xij ) is finite.
If all of the P (Xij ) are finite, then (7) follows from (4), so assume that at least
one P (Xij ) is infinite. It follows that
∑n
j=1 αjP (Xij ) =∞, and (4) implies that
supω∈Ω
∑n
j=1Xij (ω) =∞. Since,
∑n
j=1 αjcj is finite, no matter what cj values
are chosen, (7) follows. ✷
Crisma and Gigante (2001) extend Definition 5 to conditional previsions.
Their definition imposes conditions on coherence similar to those of Regazzini
(1987) (both for bounded and for unbounded random variables) that are de-
signed to regulate the extreme indeterminacy of conditional previsions given
events with zero probability. We prefer to avoid such restrictions on the defini-
tion of coherence for reasons illustrated by the following example.
Example 2. Let Ω be the positive integers, and let P (·) be a coherent2
prevision that assigns probability 0 to every singleton {n} with n a positive
integer. Many such marginal previsions exist. Let
X(ω) =
{
ω if 1 ≤ ω ≤ 4,
0 otherwise,
and let B = {1, 2, 3, 4} so that P (B) = P (X) = 0 and BX = X . The gamble
αX = α(X − 0) = αB(X − 0)(8)
is acceptable by all definitions of coherence. However, the restrictions that
Regazzini (1987), Crisma and Gigante (2001), and others impose would say that
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it is incoherent to assign P (X |B) a value outside of the closed interval [1, 4].
That is, it is incoherent to offer the gamble αB(X − 0) because 0 6∈ [1, 4]. But,
(8) shows that αB(X − 0) is already being offered without even contemplating
what would be a coherent value for P (X |B). Furthermore, for every real p,
−αpB is also being offered unconditionally, so that the sum
αB(X − 0)− αpB = αB(X − p)(9)
is being offered for every real p. We think it is perfectly reasonable to assign
P (X |B) a value between 1 and 4 if one wishes, but we don’t believe that it
should be called incoherent to do otherwise. After all, the gambles that would
be ruled out by such a declaration of incoherence are already being offered, as
(9) illustrates.
The following lemma illustrates an intuitive property of infinite previsions.
Lemma 2. Let B be an event with P (B) > 0, and let X and Y be random
variables with coherent1 previsions P (X |B) and P (Y |B) respectively. If X(ω) ≤
Y (ω) for all ω ∈ B, then P (X |B) ≤ P (Y |B).
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that P (X |B) > P (Y |B). Then, in par-
ticular, P (X |B) > −∞ and P (Y |B) <∞. Coherence1 implies that
sup
ω
{αB(ω)[X(ω)− cX ] + βB(ω)[Y (ω)− cY ] + γ[B(ω)− P (B)]} ≥ 0,(10)
where cX = P (X |B) if P (X |B) is finite, cY = P (Y |B) if P (Y |B) is finite,
α ≥ 0 if P (X |B) = ∞, and β ≤ 0 if P (Y |B) = −∞. In (10), α, β, cX and
cY are otherwise unconstrained real numbers. Choose cX > cY if either is
unconstrained. (If both are constrained, then cX > cY by assumption.) Let
α = 1, β = −1, and γ = cX − cY . Then (10) becomes
sup
ω
{B(ω)X(ω)−B(ω)Y (ω) + (cY − cX)P (B)} ≥ 0,
which is a contradiction because B(ω)[Y (ω) −X(ω)] ≤ 0 for all ω, and (cY −
cX)P (B) < 0. ✷
4. Extension of Coherence2. In this section, we extend de Finetti’s
second coherence criterion in two ways: we include more general scoring rules,
and we accommodate random variables with infinite previsions. For scoring
rules of the form (2) we write
g(x, q) =
∫ q
x
(v − x)dλ(v),(11)
where we use the convention that an integral whose limits are in the wrong
order equals the negative of the integral with the limits in the correct order. It
follows easily from (11) that, if a and b are real numbers, then
g(x, a)− g(x, b) = λ((a, b))[x − r(a, b, λ)],(12)
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where, for all a and b,
r(a, b, λ) =
∫ b
a
vdλ(v)
λ((a, b))
.(13)
In equations (12) and (13), we used the same convention as above about integrals
with limits in the wrong order. In particular, λ((a, b)) = −λ((b, a)) if a > b.
Equation 12 makes it clear that, if P (X) is infinite, then P [g(X, q)] is going
to be infinite for all q. This is why Definition 2 includes the clause that P (X) be
finite before requiring that P [g(X, q)] be minimized at a = P (X). Nevertheless,
strictly proper scoring rules can still be used to assess coherence in the spirit of
coherence2. The following is our generalization of coherence2 that applies both
with general scoring rules and with infinite previsions.
Definition 6. Let C be a class of strictly proper scoring rules. Let {(Xi, Bi) :
i ∈ I} be a collection of pairs each consisting of a random variable Xi and a
nonempty event Bi with corresponding conditional forecasts {pi : i ∈ I}. The
forecasts are coherent3 if, for every finite subset {ij : j = 1, . . . , n} ⊆ I, every
set of scoring rules {g1, . . . , gn} ⊆ C, and every set {q1, . . . , qn} of alternative
forecasts,
inf
ω
n∑
j=1
Bij (ω)
[
gj(Xij (ω), cj)− gj(Xij (ω), qj)
]
≤ 0,
where cj = pij for all j such that pij is finite, and cj is finite and between qj
and pij for all j such that pij is infinite. That is, no finite rival set of forecasts
can provide a uniformly smaller sum of scores than the original forecasts.
Theorem 1. Let C be a class of scoring rules of the form (2). A collection
of conditional previsions is coherent1 if and only if it is coherent3.
Proof. For the “only if” direction, assume that the conditional previ-
sions are coherent1. We want to show that no rival set of previsions pro-
vides uniformly smaller sum of scores than the original previsions. That is,
for each (X1, B1), . . . , (Xn, Bn) with conditional previsions p1, . . . , pn and each
set {g1, . . . , gn} ⊆ C of scoring rules and each set {q1, . . . , qn} of rival previsions,
we must show that
inf
ω
n∑
i=1
Bi(ω)[gi(Xi(ω), ci)− gi(Xi(ω), qi)] ≤ 0,(14)
where ci = pi for all i such that pi is finite, and ci is finite and between qi and
pi for all i such that pi is infinite. From (12),
n∑
i=1
Bi[gi(Xi, ci)− gi(Xi, qi)] =
n∑
i=1
λi((ci, qi))Bi[Xi − r(ci, qi, λi)].(15)
Because λi((ci, qi)) and r(ci, qi, λi)− ci have the same sign,
n∑
i=1
λi((ci, qi))Bi[r(ci, qi, λi)− ci] ≥ 0.
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Hence, the right-hand side of (15) is less than or equal to
n∑
i=1
λi((ci, qi))Bi[Xi − ci].(16)
The infimum of (15) is then less than or equal to the infimum of (16). Also
inf
ω
n∑
i=1
λi((ci, qi))Bi(ω)[Xi(ω)− ci] = − sup
ω
n∑
i=1
−λi((ci, qi))Bi(ω)[Xi(ω)− ci]
≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from coherence1 of the previsions. Hence the rival
previsions do not provide uniformly smaller sum of scores than the original
previsions.
For the “if” direction, we prove the contrapositive. Assume that the condi-
tional previsions are incoherent1. If one of the previsions is the wrong value for
a constant random variable, the result is trivial, so assume that each random
variable takes at least two distinct values. We want to find a finite set of random
variable/event pairs and corresponding conditional previsions together with a
rival set of previsions such that the provide uniformly smaller sum of scores
than the original set. That is, we need (X1, B1), . . . , (Xn, Bn) with conditional
previsions p1, . . . , pn a rival set of previsions q1, . . . , qn, and a set g1, . . . , gn of
scoring rules from C such that
inf
ω
n∑
i=1
Bi(ω)[gi(Xi(ω), ci)− gi(Xi(ω), qi)] > 0,(17)
where ci = pi for all i such that pi is finite, and ci is finite and between qi and
pi for all i such that pi is infinite. In principle, some of the rival qi could be
infinite, but the rivals that we construct below will all be finite.
By incoherence1, there exist (X1, B1), . . . , (Xn, Bn) with conditional previ-
sions p1, . . . , pn, α1, . . . , αn and ǫ > 0 such that
sup
ω
n∑
i=1
αiBi(ω)[Xi(ω)− ci] = −ǫ,(18)
where ci is finite for all i, ci = pi for all i such that pi is finite, and αi has the
same sign as pi for all i such that pi is infinite. Without loss of generality, we
can assume that maxi |αi| = 1. Let g be a scoring rule in C with corresponding
measure λ. Let gi = g for all i. Define
z0 = min
{
min
i=1,...,n
{λ((−∞, ci)) : αi > 0}, min
i=1,...,n
{λ((ci,∞)) : αi < 0}
}
,
so that z0 > 0. For each z ∈ (0, z0), define qi(z) by the equation
λ((ci, qi(z))) = −zαi,
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which is possible because λ((ci, q)) is continuous in q. Define
ℓ(z) = inf
ω
n∑
i=1
Bi(ω)[g(Xi(ω), ci)− g(Xi(ω), qi(z))].(19)
By construction ci− r(ci, qi(z), λ), ci− qi(z), and r(ci, qi(z), λ)− qi(z) have the
same sign as αi for each i, and ci − qi(z) has the largest absolute value of the
three differences. This means that, for all i such that pi is infinite and all z, ci
is between qi(z) and pi. The remainder of the proof consists of showing that
there exists z ∈ (0, z0) such that ℓ(z) > 0. The desired rival previsions are then
q1(z), . . . , qn(z). From (12),
n∑
i=1
Bi[g(Xi, ci)− g(Xi, qi(z))] =
n∑
i=1
λ((ci, qi(z)))Bi[Xi − r(ci, qi(z), λ)]
= −
n∑
i=1
zαiBi[Xi − ci]−
n∑
i=1
zαiBi[ci − r(ci, qi(z), λ)]
≥ zǫ− z
n∑
i=1
αiBi[ci − qi(z)].(20)
Since, for all i, qi(0) = ci and qi(z) is continuous in z, there exists z1 > 0 such
that, for all z ∈ (0, z1) and all ω,
n∑
i=1
αiBi(ω)[ci − qi(z)] <
ǫ
2
.(21)
Choose z ∈ (0,min{z0, zi}). Then combine (19), (20) and (21) to conclude that
ℓ(z) ≥ z
ǫ
2
> 0,
which completes the proof. ✷
5. Prevision and Expectation. The expectation of a random variable
X defined on Ω is usually defined as the integral of X over the set Ω with
respect to the underlying probability measure defined on subsets Ω. In the
countably additive setting, such integrals can be defined (except for certain
cases involving ∞ −∞) uniquely from a probability measure on Ω. Dunford
and Schwartz (1958, Chapter III) give a detailed analysis of integration, with
respect to finitely additive measures, that attempts to replicate the uniqueness
of integrals. Their analysis requires additional assumptions if one wishes to
integrate unbounded random variables.
An alternative to defining integrals with respect to specific measures is to
define integrals as special types of linear functionals. Then measures can be con-
structed from the integrals. (The integral of the indicator of a set is the measure
of the set.) This is the approach used in the study of the Daniell integral. (See
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Royden, 1968, Chapter 13. Regazzini, 1987 and Williams, 2007 takes a similar
approach for bounded random variables only.) De Finetti’s concept of prevision
turns out to be a finitely additive generalization of the Daniell integral. (See
Definition 7 below.) One major difference between the finitely additive Daniell
integral and the theory developed by Dunford and Schwartz is that coherence1
is the only assumption needed to define a finitely additive Daniell integral on
an arbitrary space of random variables, including unbounded random variables
and linear combinations of random variables with infinite integrals. Another dif-
ference is that multiple finitely additive Daniell integrals can lead to the same
finitely additive probability distribution on Ω. Put another way, the finitely ad-
ditive Daniell integral is not uniquely determined by its corresponding finitely
additive probability.
In this paper, we take the approach of defining finitely additive expectations
and probabilities in terms of finitely additive Daniell integrals, rather than in-
tegrals of the sort developed by Dunford and Schwartz (1958). This section is
devoted to deriving and illustrating the properties of finitely additive Daniell
integrals and their relation to coherent1 previsions.
Definition 7. Let L be a linear space of real-valued functions defined on
Ω that contains all constant functions, and let L be an extended-real-valued
functional defined on L. If (X,Y ∈ L and X ≤ Y ) implies L(X) ≤ L(Y ), we
say that L is nonnegative. We call L an extended-linear functional on L, if, for
all real α, β and all X,Y ∈ L,
L(αX + βY ) = αL(X) + βL(Y ),(22)
whenever the arithmetic on the right-hand side of (22) is well defined (i.e., not
∞ − ∞) and where 0 × ±∞ = 0. A nonnegative extended-linear functional
is called a finitely additive Daniell integral. (See Schervish et al, 2008a.) If
L(1) = 1, we say that L is normalized. A normalized finitely additive Daniell
integral is called a finitely additive expectation.
The following simple result contains the primary justification for the names
finitely additive Daniell integral and finitely additive expectation.
Lemma 3. Let L be a finitely additive Daniell integral on L, where L con-
tains indicators of some subsets of Ω.
1. The restriction of L to those subsets of Ω whose indicators are in L is
a finitely additive measure. If L(1) = 1, then L is a finitely additive
probability.
2. The restriction of L to the simple functions in L matches the usual defini-
tion of integral of a simple function with respect to the measure in part 1.
Proof.
1. Because the constant 1 is in L, the indicator of Ω itself is in L. If A and
B are disjoint, the indicator of A ∪ B is A + B. If A, B and A ∪ B are
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all in L, then L(A) and L(B) are both nonnegative, and linearity give
L(A ∪B) = L(A) + L(B), and the sum is well defined. So L is a finitely
additive measure. If L(1) = 1, nonnegativity implies that L, restricted to
the set of indicators of events, is a finitely additive probability on Ω.
2. Let X =
∑n
i=1 αiAi be a simple function with each Ai ∈ L, all Ai disjoint,
and all αi distinct. Then linearity gives L(X) =
∑n
i=1 αiL(Ai), which is
well defined and which matches the usual definition of the integral of X
with respect to the measure L.
✷
Finitely additive expectations are like integrals in several ways, e.g., the two
parts of Lemma 3 as well as the linearity in Lemma 5 below. Another way in
which finitely additive expectations are like integrals is continuity with respect
to the uniform metric. The proof of the following result is trivial and omitted.
Proposition 1. Let X and Y be elements of a linear space L of real-valued
functions defined on Ω. Suppose that supω |X(ω) − Y (ω)| ≤ ǫ. Then, for each
finitely additive expectation L on L, either |L(X) − L(Y )| ≤ ǫ or L(X) and
L(Y ) equal the same infinite value.
A special application of Proposition 1 is to a bounded function X . Every
bounded function can be approximated arbitrarily closely by simple functions.
So long as all of the approximating simple functions are in L, their finitely addi-
tive expectations will be arbitrarily close to the expectation of X . For example,
if L is the set of functions that are measurable with respect to a σ-field, then
every bounded function in L is uniformly approximable by simple functions in
L. The expectations of all bounded random variables are then uniquely de-
termined from the finitely additive probability on L. Hence, when the finitely
additive expectation defined here is restricted to bounded functions measurable
with respect to a σ-field, it is the same as the definition of integral developed by
Dunford and Schwartz (1958), and it is the same as the integral used by Dubins
(1975) in his results about disintegrability.
On a linear space, coherent1 previsions are the same as finitely additive
expectations. One direction is simpler to prove than the other.
Lemma 4. Let L be a finitely additive expectation on a linear space L =
{Xi : i ∈ I}. Then L is a coherent1 marginal prevision.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that a finitely additive expectation L is
incoherent1 when used as a marginal prevision. From the definition of finitely
additive expectation, the domain of L is a linear space that contains all con-
stants. Incoherence1 implies that there exist i1, . . . , in ∈ I, real numbers α1, . . . , αn,
and real numbers c1, . . . , cn such that αj has the same sign as L(Xij ) when
L(Xij ) is infinite, cj = L(Xij ) when L(Xij ) is finite, and
sup
ω
n∑
j=1
αj [Xij (ω)− cj ] < 0.
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It follows that, there is ǫ > 0 such that
sup
ω
n∑
j=1
αjXij (ω) = −ǫ+
n∑
j=1
αjcj .
By nonnegativity and linearity of L,
L

 n∑
j=1
αjXij

 ≤ −ǫ+
n∑
j=1
αjcj .(23)
But
L

 n∑
j=1
αjXij

 =
n∑
j=1
αjL(Xij ),(24)
because the arithmetic on the right-hand side of (24) is well defined (positive if
infinite). A +∞ value on the right-hand side of (24) would contradict (23) as
would a finite value. ✷
The other direction requires an additional result that is useful in its own
right.
Lemma 5. Let D = {Xi : i ∈ I} be a set of random variables that contains
all constants, and let Q be a coherent1 prevision on D. Let L be that part
of the linear span of D that consists of linear combinations of the form Y =∑n
j=1 αjXij where each Xij ∈ D, and pY =
∑n
j=1 αjQ(Xij ) is well-defined.
Then P (Y ) = pY for all Y ∈ L is well-defined, and it is the unique coherent1
extension of Q to L.
Proof. We show first that P is well-defined, and then that it is the unique
coherent1 extension of Q to L. Throughout the proof, we rely on Lemma 1
because the proof is slightly less cumbersome when worded in terms of extended-
coherence. To see that P is well-defined, suppose to the contrary that Y ∈ L
has two representations
Y =
n∑
j=1
αjXij =
m∑
k=1
βkXℓk ,(25)
such that
n∑
j=1
αjQ(Xij ) 6=
m∑
k=1
βkQ(Xℓk),(26)
where both sides of (26) are well-defined sums. That
0 ≡
n∑
j=1
αjXij −
m∑
k=1
βkXℓk(27)
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is immediate from (25). Regardless of which sides (if any) of (26) are finite or
infinite,
n∑
j=1
αjQ(Xij )−
m∑
k=1
βkQ(Xℓk) 6= 0,(28)
and the sum on the left-hand side of (28) is well-defined. This contradicts
extended-coherence when combined with (27).
That P is extended-coherent is immediate from Definition 5. It is also clear
that P extends Q to L. For each Y ∈ L, to see that pY is the unique extended-
coherent value for P (Y ), let Y ∈ L be represented as stated and let p be an
extended real number such that
p 6=
n∑
j=1
αjQ(Xij ).(29)
We prove that setting P (Y ) = p is extended-incoherent. The sum
− p+
n∑
j=1
αjQ(Xij )(30)
is well-defined, regardless of whether or not either side or both sides of (29) are
finite. Then 0 ≡ −Y +
∑n
j=1 αjXij but (30) is not 0, which makes P (Y ) = p
extended-incoherent when combined with existing previsions. ✷
We can now prove the converse to Lemma 4.
Lemma 6. Let P be a coherent1 marginal prevision on a linear space L that
contains all constants. Then P is a finitely additive expectation.
Proof. That P (1) = 1 is immediate from coherence1. Lemma 2 tells us
that X ≤ Y implies P (X) ≤ P (Y ). That P is extended-linear follows from
Lemma 5. ✷
The ways in which coherent1 previsions are more general than finitely addi-
tive expectations are the following:
• The domain of a coherent1 prevision need not be a linear space.
• The domain of a coherent1 prevision need not contain all constants.
• The definition of finitely additive expectation does not, as it stands, deal
with conditional expectations.
It is trivial to extend the domain of a coherent1 prevision to include all constants.
To extend the domain of a coherent1 prevision beyond what Lemma 5 provides
is the subject of the Fundamental Theorem of Prevision (Theorem 2). The
results in Section 6 give the tools needed to give meaning to finitely additive
conditional expectation.
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6. Relationship Between Conditional Previsions and Marginal
Previsions. The relationship between marginal previsions and integrals is
much more intuitive than the relationship between general conditional previ-
sions and integrals. Even in the countably additive theory, conditional expec-
tations are defined as Radon-Nikodym derivatives rather than as integrals. In
the finitely additive theory used here, we defined finitely additive expectations
(marginal previsions) as a type of integral (see Section 5). To a large extent,
conditional previsions and marginal previsions determine each other. We make
that statement precise in this section.
The results of this section fall into two categories:
• There are some relationships between conditional and marginal previsions
that must hold in order for them to be jointly coherent1. For example
P (XB) = P (B)P (X |B),
whenever the the product on the right is not 0 times an infinite value.
• There are some cases with P (B) = 0 in which P (X |B) is completely
unconstrained by other specified previsions.
The first result is that, when P (B) > 0, P (X |B) is uniquely determined
from P (B) and P (XB).
Lemma 7. Let D = {(Xi, Bi) : i ∈ I} be a collection of random vari-
able/nonempty event pairs with coherent1 conditional previsions {P (Xi|Bi) :
i ∈ I}. Let (X,B) be a random variable/nonempty event pair such that (B,Ω)
and (XB,Ω) are in D and P (B) > 0. Then the only possible coherent1 value
for P (X |B) is P (XB)/P (B) (even if the numerator is infinite.)
Proof. Let P (B) = q. First, assume that P (XB) = p is finite. We start
by showing that the gamble αB(X − p/q) is acceptable for all real α. We know
that α(XB − p) and −(p/q)α(B − q) are acceptable for all real α. Hence the
following gamble is acceptable:
α(XB − p)− (p/q)α(B − q) = αB(X − p/q).
To see that every value other than p/q is incoherent1, suppose that P (X |B) =
r 6= p/q. Then the following gamble would be acceptable for all real α:
α(XB − p)− rα(B − q)− αB(X − r) = α(−p+ rq) < 0,
when α has the opposite sign as −p + rq. Next assume that P (XB) = ∞, as
the P (XB) = −∞ case is similar. First, we show that all gambles of the form
αB(X − c) with c real and α ≥ 0 are acceptable. For each α ≥ 0 and real c, let
c1 = cq and β = −αc. Then
αB(X − c) = α(BX − c1) + β(B − q),
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and the sum of gambles on the right is acceptable. To see that P (X |B) < ∞
is incoherent1, let α < 0, and let c be real. If αB(X − c) were acceptable, then
the following gamble would be acceptable for all real d:
αB(X − c)− α(XB − d) + αc(B − q) = −α(d+ cq).
Let d > −cq to see that the infimum is negative. ✷
When P (B) = 0, there may be multiple possible coherent1 values of P (X |B),
but the set of possible values are determined from P (XB).
Lemma 8. Let D = {(Xi, Bi) : i ∈ I} be a collection of random vari-
able/nonempty event pairs with coherent1 conditional previsions {P (Xi|Bi) :
i ∈ I}. Let (X,B) be a random variable/nonempty event pair such that (B,Ω)
and (XB,Ω) are in D and P (B) = 0.
1. If P (XB) 6= 0, the only possible coherent1 value for P (X |B) is the infinite
value with the same sign as P (XB).
2. If P (XB) = 0, one can choose P (X |B) to be any extended-real number
cX .
Proof.
1. Let c′ have the same sign as P (XB) if P (XB) is infinite, and let c′ =
P (XB) otherwise. To see that the specified infinite value is coherent1,
we will show that, for all real c and all α with the same sign as P (XB),
αB(X − c) is an acceptable gamble plus a positive number. For each such
α and c,
αB(X − c) = α(BX − c′)− αcB + αc′,
where αc′ > 0 and the other two gambles on the right are acceptable. To
see that no other value is coherent1, suppose that we try to set P (X |B) =
p, where p is not the infinite value with the same sign as P (XB). Then
the following gamble is acceptable, where α has the same sign as P (XB),
and c = p if p is finite:
−αB(X − c) + α(XB − c′)− αcB = −c′α < 0.
Hence P (X |B) = p is incoherent1.
2. We show that all gambles of the form αXB(X − cX) with αX and cX real
are acceptable. For each such αX and cX , let β = −αXcX . Then
αXB(X − cX) = αXXB + βB,
and the two gambles on the right are acceptable.
✷
We are now in a position to define finitely additive conditional expectation.
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Definition 8. Let L be a linear space of random variables, and let B be
a collection of nonempty events that includes Ω. Suppose that XB ∈ L for
every X ∈ L and B ∈ B. Let L be a finitely additive expectation on L. Let
L(·|·) : L × B → IR ∪ {±∞} be such that for each B ∈ B, L(·|B) is a finitely
additive expectation on L with L(XB|B) = L(X |B) for all X ∈ L and such
that {L(X |B) : X ∈ L, B ∈ B} is a coherent1 conditional prevision. Then we
call L(·|·) a finitely additive conditional expectation.
The following result, whose proof is trivial, says that coherent1 conditional
prevision given an event of positive probability defines a finitely additive condi-
tional expectation.
Proposition 2. Let P be a coherent1 prevision on a linear space L con-
taining all constants. Let B = {B : P (B) > 0}. Assume that XB ∈ L for each
X ∈ L and B ∈ B. Define L(X |B) = P (XB)/P (B) for all X ∈ L and B ∈ B.
Then L(·|·) is a finitely additive conditional expectation.
In light of Lemma 8, it is clear that not every coherent1 conditional prevision
given an event of 0 probability defines a finitely additive conditional expectation.
After we prove the Fundamental Theorem of Prevision, we can show (Lemma 10)
that, if we start with a coherent1 marginal prevision, then for each nonempty
event with 0 probability, there exists a coherent1 conditional prevision that
defines a a finitely additive conditional expectation.
7. The Fundamental Theorem of Prevision. Attempts to define a
unique expectation from a probability often fail to provide an expectation for a
random variable of the form X − Y where both X and Y have infinite integral,
especially when XY is identically 0. Finitely additive expectations for such
random variables are guaranteed to exist, but they may not be unique. The
tool for extending a coherent1 collection of (conditional) previsions to a larger
collection is the fundamental theorem of prevision.
De Finetti (1974) proved an elementary version of the fundamental theorem
of prevision. That versions said that, if a collection of events has been assigned
coherent1 previsions, then for each additional event E, there is a nonempty
closed interval such that one can coherently choose P (E) to equal any number
in that interval. Here, we prove a very general version that applies to unbounded
random variables, infinite previsions, conditional previsions, and extensions to
arbitrary collections of random variables.
The main step in the general version of the fundamental theorem is to start
with a collection of coherent1 conditional previsions and add one additional
coherent1 marginal prevision.
Lemma 9. Let D = {(Xi, Bi) : i ∈ I} be a collection of random vari-
able/nonempty event pairs with coherent1 conditional previsions {P (Xi|Bi) :
i ∈ I}. Let X be a random variable. Then there exists a nonempty interval
[a, b] such that P (X |Ω) = p is coherent1 with the previsions in D if and only if
p ∈ [a, b].
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Proof. Let C be the set of acceptable gambles, and define
A = {f : ∃Y ∈ C with Y + f ≤ X},
B = {f : ∃Y ∈ C with − Y + f ≥ X},
a = supA,
b = inf B.
The first step is to show that a ≤ b. If either A = ∅ or B = ∅, the inequality is
trivial, so assume that neither set is empty. We need to show that for all fa ∈ A
and f b ∈ B, fa ≤ f b. For all fa ∈ A and f b ∈ B, there exist Y a, Y b ∈ C be
such that
Y a + fa ≤ X ≤ −Y b + f b.
Hence
Y a + Y b ≤ f b − fa.
Since Y a+Y b ∈ C, supω[Y
a(ω)+Y b(ω)] ≥ 0, it follows that f b− fa ≥ 0, which
completes the first step.
The second step is to show that every value in the interval [a, b] is a coherent1
value for P (X |Ω). Let p ∈ [a, b]. We need to show that, for every Y ∈ C,
supω{Y (ω) + α[X(ω) − c]} ≥ 0, where c = p if p is finite, and α has the same
sign as p if p is infinite. Consider first, the case when p is finite. Suppose, to the
contrary, that there exists Y ∈ C and α such that supω{Y (ω) +α[X(ω)− p]} =
−ǫ < 0. Clearly α 6= 0. If α > 0, then X ≤ p − (ǫ/α) − Y/α. Since α > 0,
Y/α ∈ C, so p−(ǫ/α) ∈ B and p−(ǫ/α) ≥ b, which contradicts p ≤ b. Similarly,
if α < 0, then X ≥ p− (ǫ/α)− Y/α. Since α < 0, −Y/α ∈ C, so p− (ǫ/α) ∈ A
and p − (ǫ/alpha) ≤ a, which contradicts p ≥ a. Next, consider the case in
which p = −∞ so that α < 0, a = −∞, and A = ∅. Then −Y/α ∈ C, and
X ≥ c− (ǫ/α)−Y/α, which means that c− (ǫ/α) ∈ A, which contradicts A = ∅.
Finally, if p = ∞, then α > 0, b = ∞, B = ∅, Y/α ∈ C, X ≤ c − (ǫ/α) − Y/α,
c− (ǫ/α) ∈ B, a contradiction.
The last step is to prove that every number outside of the interval [a, b] is an
incoherent1 choice for P (X |Ω). First, assume that we choose P (X |Ω) = p < a.
Of necessity, A 6= ∅, a > −∞, and for every f ∈ A, there exists Y ∈ C such
that Y + f ≤ X . Let α < 0, let c = p if p is finite and c < a if p = −∞. Next,
choose f ∈ (c, a] and Y ∈ C such that Y + f ≤ X . Then −αY ∈ C, and
α(X − c)− αY ≤ α(f − c) < 0,
showing that P (X |Ω) = p is incoherent1. Finally, assume that we choose
P (X |Ω) = p > b. Of necessity, B 6= ∅, b < ∞, and for every f ∈ B, there
exists Y ∈ C such that −Y + f ≥ X . Let α > 0, let c = p if p is finite and c > b
if p = ∞. Next, choose f ∈ [b, c) and Y ∈ C such that −Y + f ≥ X . Then
αY ∈ C, and
α(X − c) + αY ≤ α(f − c) < 0,
showing that P (X |Ω) = p is incoherent1. ✷
As an example of Lemma 9, we return to Example 1
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Example 3. In Example 1, Ω is the set of integers. We introduced a random
variable X =
∑∞
k=1 k{ω = k} after assigning previsions P ({ω = k}) = 2
−k for
k ≥ 1. We then proved (among other things) that every number in the interval
[2,∞] could be chosen as a coherent1 prevision for X . This fact actually follows
from Lemma 9. Let D = {({ω = k},Ω) : k an integer}. The acceptable gambles
have the form
Y (ω) =
∞∑
k=1
αk
[
{ω = k} − 2−k
]
,
where only finitely many αk are nonzero. In order for Y + f ≤ X it is necessary
and sufficient that
f ≤
∞∑
k=1
αk2
−k + inf
k≥1
(k − αk) = 2−
∞∑
k=1
(k − αk)2
−k + inf
k≥1
(k − αk).
Since
∑∞
k=1(k−αk)2
−k ≥ infk≥1(k−αk), we have f ≤ 2. We can get f as close
as we want to 2 by choosing αk = k for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n and n large. This makes
a = 2 in Lemma 9. Since supω[−Y (ω) + f ] is finite for all acceptable gambles
and all f , −Y + f ≥ X is impossible. Hence, the set B in the proof of Lemma 9
is empty, and b =∞.
We are now in position to prove the general extension theorem.
Theorem 2. Let D = {(Xi, Bi) : i ∈ I} be a collection of random vari-
able/nonempty event pairs with coherent1 conditional previsions {P (Xi|Bi) :
i ∈ I} and that contains all pairs of the form (c,Ω) with c a real number. Let F
be a set of random variable/nonempty event pairs that contains D. Then there
exists a coherent1 extension P
′ of P to F .
Proof. We prove the result by extending P one gamble at a time and
applying transfinite induction to cover the whole set F . Let D0 = D and
P0 = P . Well-order the set F \ D as {(Xγ , Bγ) : 1 ≤ γ ≤ Γ}. For each
γ ≤ Γ, let Dγ = D ∪ {(Xβ, Bβ) : 1 ≤ β ≤ γ}. For each successor ordinal
γ + 1, assume that we have a coherent1 extension Pγ to Dγ . (The assumption
is true by hypothesis when γ = 0.) We extend Pγ to Dγ+1 as follows. Apply
Lemma 9 with D = Dγ and X = Bγ+1 to find a coherent1 marginal prevision
for Bγ+1. Let D′ = Dγ ∪ {(Bγ+1,Ω)}. Apply Lemma 9 with D = D′ and
X = Xγ+1Bγ+1 to find a coherent1 marginal prevision for Xγ+1Bγ+1. Apply
Lemma 7 or Lemma 8 to find a coherent1 conditional prevision for Xγ+1 given
Bγ+1. Set Pγ+1(Xγ+1|Bγ+1) equal to this coherent1 conditional prevision. This
completes the induction step for successor ordinals.
If γ is a limit ordinal, assume that we have a coherent1 extension of P to
Pβ for all β < γ. Each (X,B) ∈ Dγ is either in D or equals (Xβ , Bβ) for some
β < γ. So we define Pγ(X |B) = Pβ(X |B). These previsions are coherent1
because every finite collection appears in the induction at some β < γ. This
completes the proof of the induction step. ✷
Finally, we can prove the existence of finitely additive conditional expecta-
tions that agree with coherent1 conditional previsions.
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Lemma 10. Let D be a collection of random variables that contains all con-
stants with coherent1 marginal previsions P (·). Let L be the linear span of all
functions of the form XB for X ∈ D and B a nonempty event. There exists a
coherent1 conditional prevision on the set {(X,B) : X ∈ L, B 6= ∅} such that
P (·|B) is a finitely additive conditional expectation for each nonempty B.
Proof. Use Theorem 2 to extend P to {(X,Ω) : X ∈ L}, which includes all
pairs of the form (B,Ω) with B 6= ∅. Lemma 7 and the first part of Lemma 8
specify all of the conditional previsions whose coherent1 values are uniquely de-
termined from the marginal previsions. The proof of the second part of Lemma 8
actually shows that P (X |B) can simultaneously be set to arbitrary values for all
(X,B) with P (B) = P (XB) = 0. The proof will be complete if we can choose
values for all such P (X |B) so that the resulting P (·|·) is a finitely additive
conditional expectation. The only restrictions that we have to obey are those
caused by conditional previsions fixed by the first part of Lemma 8. For each B
with P (B) = 0 and each X ∈ L, let XB : B → IR be defined by XB(ω) = X(ω)
for ω ∈ B. That is, XB is X restricted to domain B. Let DB be the set of
all (XB, B) such that X ∈ L and either P (X |B) is uniquely determined by the
first part of Lemma 8 or X is constant on B. For constant X , set Q(XB|B)
equal to that constant, and for all other X , let Q(XB|B) = P (X |B). This
makes Q(·|B) a coherent1 marginal prevision on DB with B as the state space.
Use Theorem 2 with Ω = B and D = DB to extend Q to {(XB, B) : X ∈ L},
which makes Q(·|B) a finitely additive expectation on {XB : X ∈ L}. Define
P (X |B) = Q(XB|B), and note that P (XB|B) = P (X |B) and P (·|·) is a finitely
additive conditional expectation. ✷
8. Discussion. In this paper we extend both of de Finetti’s (1974) con-
cepts of coherent prevision to unbounded random variables and infinite pre-
visions. We define infinite prevision so that it makes sense in the gambling
interpretation of prevision. We define how proper scoring rules can be used to
score potentially infinite previsions. We extend the equivalence of the avoidance
of sure loss from gambling and the nonexistence of uniformly smaller scores to
a large class of strictly proper scoring rules and potentially infinite previsions.
We use a finitely additive extension of the concept of Daniell integral to define
finitely additive expectation on an arbitrary linear space of random variables,
and show that it is equivalent to our extension of coherence to include infinite
previsions. We give a version of the fundamental theorem of prevision that
applies to unbounded random variables, infinite previsions, and conditional pre-
visions. The fundamental theorem allows extension of a coherent conditional
prevision from an arbitrary set of random variables to an arbitrary larger set of
random variables, including the set of all random variables.
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